INTRODUCTION
The discount rate used by consumers indicates the extent to which they will invest in energy conservation. It is therefore a key element in predicting the sales of conservation equipment and, eventually, the demand for energy itself. Few consumers know their own discount rate, yet their observed willingness to exchange an investment in energy conservation made today for future energy savings permits calculation of an implied discount rate.
There have been only limited attempts to estimate implied discount ra~s because such detailed data for individual consumers are rarely available. Moreover, the tradeoff is rarely clean because other elements enter the decision.
Many conservation measures, for example, involve a change in amenities or status. The primary data, measure cost and energy savings, are difficult to obtain, even for a small sample.
Average values or estimates are often substituted. Corum and O'Neal, for example, created prototype houses to estimate the energy savings from insulation. 1 Johnson relied on utility bills as a proxy for en~rgy efficiency and compared these to the sale prices of houses. 2 Hausman's study used regression techniques to estimate electricity savings from improved air-conditioner efficiencies. 3 The range in reported consumer discount rates is large, from the negative rates found by Johnson to more than 25% cited by Hausman.
In another study, Gately discussed the apparent high discount rates implied by the sale of standard and high-efficiency refrigerators. In the East region, for example, more than 70% of the total refrigerator sa~es were either these standard or high-efficiency models.
Average 1979 electricity prices for the five sales regions are also shown at the bottom of Table 1 . t
The high-efficiency refrigerator"was given significant advertising, both at point of sale and through th~ media. Sales personnel were instructed in its features, and often could tell customers the antici- * The sales reported here occurred before the introduction of the Federal Trade Commission's "Energyguide" appliance labels, so consumers were forced to rely on information provided by the salesperson or printed sources of information.
-3-high-efficiency model accounted for only 24-43% of the matched pair sales.
Neither model was popular in the Southwest because consumers in this warm region preferred larger models with built-in icemakers nor did the manufacturer consistently distribute the matched-pair in the southwest. For these reasons, we have excluded the southwest region from further analysis.
ANALYSIS OF I~~LIED DISCOUNT RATES
The economically rational consumer will be indifferent between the standard and high-efficiency model if the present value (using the consumer's discount rate) of the electricity savings equals the additiona! cost of the high-efficiency model. If the standard model is preferred, then his discount rate must be higher than that when he is assumed to be indifferent. We use this observation to calculate minimum implied discount rates for consumers.
The condition for indifference between the two models occurs when the incremental cost equals the present value of the electricity savings, i.e., .
• Table 2 lists real discount rates for a range of electricity prices from 2 -10 cents/kWh. Since we do not know the consumer's amortization time for refrigerators, we calculated the discount rates for 5, 10, and 20 years; the typical physical lifetime of a refrigerator is 20 years. 5
The implied discount rate is insensitive to the length of the amortizatiori period, even at moderate electricity prices. Thus, this uncertainty is not especially damaging. An adjustment for energy price escalation must be included if the consumers are thought to have considered the ...
' rising electricity price in their cost-benefit calculation. This adjustment is explained in the legend for Table 2 .
DISCUSSION
The sales data in Table 1 , combined with the calculated discount rates in Table 2 , suggest that a large proportion of consumers behave as though they had high real discount rates. In the Pacific sales region, for example, 60% of the refrigerator buyers in 1979 behaved as if they had discount rates above 34% (because they bought the standard nodel).
In the South sales region, 59% of the consumers appeared to have -5-discount rates above 41%.
We used these results to construct a distribution of consumer discount rates. We know some variation in discount rates must be present because of the split in sales. Sone consumers (perhaps the wealthier ones) will have lower discount rates while, others (perhaps the poorer) will have higher rates. Hausman, for example, reported decreasing discount rates with increasing income. Further, we assumed that the distribution of consumer discount rates is the same for all sales regions. In this way, data for one region can be applied nationwide. Figure 1 shows the distribution of implied discount rates indicated by our data. We assumed that all consumers had discount rates below 120% and above -20% in order to provide closure. The data are too scanty to construct a smooth distribution. Nevertheless, Fig. 1 suggests that considerable variation in discount rates exists: about twofifths of the consumers act as though they had real discount rates below 35%, one-fifth between 35% and 60%, and another two-fifths greater than 60%. The equivalent nominal rates would be about 10% higher.
There is an implicit story behind this analysis. The consumer has already chosen both the class of refrigerator and the store in which he will buy it. Upon entering the store, he is confronted with the final decision, namely, whether to buy the standard or high-efficiency model. Nevertheless, it is significant that a large proportion of consumers avoided an energy-conservation investment that had little risk and a payback period of less than three years.
Aggregate data must be treated cautiously because we cannot be certain that the purchaser and the user are the same person. Appliances are also purchased by ho~e builders and landlords. These buyers lack any, incentive to invest in appliances with higher efficiencies because they do not pay for appliance electricity consumption! Contractors and landlords could be responsible for the continued sales of standard models, while consumers who expect to pay the electric bills are buying t Some refrigerator manufacturers sell half of their total production to home builders; source: David Cook, Business Editor, The Christian Science Monitor, personal communication, February 18, 1982.
We estimate that about one-third of all refrigerators are purchased by builders and landlords who will not be paying for the electricity consumption.
-7-the efficient units. However, the manufacturer of these refrigerators has conducted numerous customer surveys and found that very few landlords or contractors buy either model. We can infer that essentially all the buyers of these two models will be paying the electricity bills.
We are, in fact, measuring an implied discount rate because the benefits and costs of the investment accrue to the same person.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that three-fifths of the refrigerator buyers had an implied discount rate greater than 35%, that is, they avoided a conservation investment with a simple payback time of three years.
In spite of the aggregate form of the data, the results are particularly accurate because: the two refrigerators provided an identical amenity, the user's behavior did not significantly affect the energy consumption, and the increMental cost was constant and the sales environment consistent. We also know that the consumer was provided relatively good information regarding the expected energy savings. Finally, we are confident that the purchasers expected to pay for the electricity consumption.
The data nevertheless cannot tell us whether the high implied discount rate is a result of a high actual discount rate or some other factor not accounted for in this study. Kempton and Nontgomery offer several explanations for consumer actions that imply high apparent discount rates. 6 Poor access to information, in particular, may account for the observed consumer behavior. However, consumer information in our case was better than in virtually any other energy-related investment (i.e., insulation, efficient air conditioners, etc. Table 2 . Implied discount rates given different assumptions for electricity prices and amortization periods. A consumer will be indifferent between the purchase of the high-efficiency and standard refrigerators at the specified electricity price and amortization period. All of these calculations assume that the incremental cost of the highefficiency refrigerator was $40, the incremental energy savings were 410 kWh/y, and there was no (real) electricity ·price escalation. In the Pacific region, for example, a consumer using a 34% discount rate will be indifferent between the two models (assuming a 10-year amortization) if electricity prices do not increase. The discount rates listed in the table must be increased if a consumer is to remain indifferent in the face of anticipated electricity price inflation. If electricity prices are expected to increase at a 10% nominal rate, then the consumer must use a 44% discount rate. Real consumer discount rate (%)
:mL 3211-3453 Fig. 1 . The distribution of consumer discount rates implied by consumer purchasing patterns of energy-efficient refrigerators. The East region data show that 40% of the consumers acted as though they had real discount rates above 58%, and the Hidwest regionshow that 45% of the consumers used discount rates above 56%. Therefore, 5% of the consumers had real discount rates between 56 and 58%. The remaining boxes to the left were constructed in a similar fashion. The dashed boxes at the two ends are based on the assumption that there are no discount rates less than -20% or above 120%. Equivalent nominal discount rates are about 10% higher than those shown. Adjusting for positive electricity price escalation or nominal prices corresponds to shifting the distribution to ~he right by the appropriate percentage. ..
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